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frontières pourrait être à la base de nouvelles limites. Or, en bout de ligne, ce 
seront des considérations géopolitiques de sécurité qui prévaudront : la situation 
explosive en Amérique du Nord milite pour l’établissement de zones neutres. Cette 
solution est celle qui est finalement retenue, la tâche des diplomates consistant 
désormais à s’entendre sur les limites de ces zones « abandonnées aux Sauvages » 
(p.420). Ce plan n’aura finalement pas lieu : la guerre est officiellement déclenchée 
au printemps 1756.
 Cette recension met l’accent sur l’axe transatlantique et ne peut faire justice à 
la richesse des autres thèmes abordés avec brio par le Professeur Ternat: la société 
et la culture des diplomates au milieu du XVIIIe siècle, la complexité du processus 
de restitution territoriale outre-mer, les débats sur le remboursement des prises 
faites en mer, la liberté de commerce et la crainte d’une monarchie universelle 
britannique, le rôle des compagnies à charte lors des discussions sur les Indes 
orientales, l’importance accordée à la présence des Indigènes sur les territoires 
disputés, et bien d’autres encore. 
 Un petit bémol : il aurait peut-être été souhaitable que la chronologie présentée 
en annexe de l’ouvrage soit plus détaillée, ou que certaines thématiques aient été 
restreintes afin de mieux orienter le lecteur. Au final, Ternat parvient à accomplir 
un tour de force. Il démontre que loin d’être futile, la diplomatie de la paix franco-
britannique de 1748 à 1756 est un véritable laboratoire sur « l’outillage mental », 
comme l’indique Lucien Bély dans sa préface (p.10), des dirigeants métropolitains 
et sur l’évolution de leurs visions du monde outre-mer. L’œuvre de Ternat devient 
une référence incontournable.
Alexandre Michaud
Université d’Ottawa
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Béla Tomka has set himself the daunting task of producing a social history of 
twentieth century Europe that covers all of the continent’s geographical regions, 
provides as much comparative analysis among regions and nations as feasible, 
and attempts to grasp general trends without neglecting the national and local 
specificities that call into question general explanations of contemporary social 
development. He explicitly eschews adopting particular theoretical perspectives 
or grand narratives, preferring to let the data either support or call in question 
existing approaches, as the case may be. He finds this self-denial to be appropriate 
to what he refers to as a “post paradigmatic world” (p. 6) where the myriad 
exceptions to general trends must be allowed to emerge.
 Tomka largely succeeds in his attempt to be as geographically comprehensive 
and as comparative as possible within the framework of a single volume and the 
limits of the data. Europe’s Northwestern, Scandinavian, Central, and Southern 
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regions are carefully distinguished for differences in the pace of social development 
and treatment of the East Central and Southeastern zones, in both their capitalist 
and non-capitalist phases, is included in the analysis. Considerations of space and 
a shortage of adequate comparative data lead him to exclude the USSR and Baltic 
states. 
 The book is divided into ten chapters, including an introduction and conclusion. 
The central chapters each constitute a separate essay tracing the shifts in a particular 
realm of social reality from before the First World War to the turn of the twenty-
first century. Beginning with population, Tomka notes that, by the century’s end, 
falling birth and death rates had signalled a demographic transition from the higher 
mortality and birth rates of the first half of the century. One is especially struck by 
the stunning decline in infant mortality and rise in life expectancy over this period. 
Family and household structure were transformed, the nuclear family dominating 
over more extended versions after the Second World War, but accompanied 
after 1960 by the remarkable increase in divorces and the rising frequency of 
unmarried cohabitation and increasing numbers of children born out of wedlock. 
Issues of social mobility, shifts in class structure, and distribution of wealth and 
income are extensively analyzed, with Tomka arguing that class remains more 
fundamental than factors like gender as a determinant of inequality. For Tomka, 
one of the central social realities in Europe has been the creation of the welfare 
state, which from its beginnings in the nineteenth century and interwar years 
became a central feature of European life after the Second World War. He finds 
that while the expansion of social provision tapered off after the 1970s, it mostly 
endured at the century’s end despite some fraying and the challenges globalization 
posed to the national state. The century also saw the transformation of work and 
living standards: the hours of work in a calendar year declined significantly, 
offering more leisure to working people, though women only gradually came to 
enjoy some measure of the leisure available to their partners. Benchmarks of the 
progress of living standards and consumption over the century are exemplified 
by the near universality of bathrooms by 1990 (for example, 99.5% in Britain 
compared with 62.4% in 1950 (p. 230)) and by the widespread consumption of 
such items as cars, radios, and television. Politically, after the setbacks of the 
interwar years, parliamentary democracy prevailed, the Stalinist zone and the 
authoritarian regimes in Spain and Portugal eventually making the transition. The 
political importance of class waned after the Second World War and new social 
movements based on identity politics came to the fore after 1960. Urbanization 
grew, accompanied by sub-urbanization and re-urbanization. Education expanded 
at all levels, including the post-secondary, where by 1995 women often constituted 
half of the students; yet, educational opportunity remained adversely affected by 
social inequality. Europe also became increasingly secular, at least as indicated by 
declining church attendance and numbers of baptisms and marriages, though there 
are wide regional variations; both atheists and those failing to declare a religious 
affiliation remained in the minority. 
 This is only the merest sampling of Tomka’s material, which is rich in detail, the 
range of questions considered, and in analytical reflection. Tomka finds exceptions 
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to almost every general trend he considers and typically rejects claims for linear 
or irreversible development. He has an admirable love of data and for the way 
quantitative information so often reveals the difficulty of making generalizations 
about a continent of such diversity. Though respectful of and impressively engaged 
with the social sciences, he consistently subjects theoretical claims to empirical 
evaluation and emphasizes the many questions that remain unanswered. Along 
with the analysis, his data is usefully presented in some seventy-five tables, which 
are a major source for students, teachers, and researchers. 
 Historians who, like the present writer, are interested in global political 
economy rather than social history per se, may well wish for stronger moorings in 
class and capital than Tomka provides. For example, when discussing the origins 
of Nazism, Tomka does not register Adam Tooze’s important point (The Wages 
of Destruction, 2006) that Hitler was preoccupied with meeting the challenge of 
American world power, a global political-economic factor that must complement 
any analysis based on German domestic social factors. Again, when explaining the 
origins of the welfare state, Tomka generally favours functionalism over conflict 
theory, citing evidence that social reform was not only supported by working 
class parties. Yet, as Gary Teeple has argued, the welfare state’s contribution to 
capitalist reproduction included the maintenance of social peace as much as the 
creation of such essentials as a healthy and educated workforce, making reform 
acceptable across the political spectrum. Nor was the potential threat to domestic 
peace simply a matter of party politics: the larger threat of extra-parliamentary 
popular radicalism at home, memories of the Great Depression (the longer term 
impact of which Tomka underestimates), popular mobilization during wartime, 
the presence of Communist-led anti-fascist resistance movements, the political 
impact of expansion of non-capitalist regimes into Europe itself and of on-going 
Communist threats in the Third World had to be matters of domestic political 
concern for those determined to protect capitalism after the Second World War. 
Here, political economy intersects with social reality in ways Tomka’s approach 
cannot capture. What is missing is a sense of the enormous impact thirty years of 
upheaval driven by war and economic crisis had on European development after 
the Second World War, resulting in both the expanded welfare state and increased 
state intervention in the economy. 
 In his Age of Extremes, Eric Hobsbawm reminds us that underlying the 
remarkable and problematic transformations of the twentieth century is the 
development of global capitalism. Hobsbawm’s chapters on economic expansion 
after the Second World War and the social and cultural revolutions that it 
generated are masterpieces of social history that integrate the economic and social 
in compelling ways. One misses that integration here. That said, Tomka’s project 
is different and his book is without question remarkably learned and full of useful 
material. It is a work that would surely have found its way into Hobsbawm’s 
bibliography. 
Mark Gabbert
University of Manitoba
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